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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the optimal economic management of the Baltic Sea fisheries from a 
more holistic approach than traditionally, and thus takes a step towards ecosystem-based 
management. Such management can be interpreted as integrated management of the 
ecosystem instead of concentrating on a single issue in isolation. First, the focus is on 
optimal multispecies fisheries management in the Baltic Sea under climate change, which 
is expanded to the international context in order to examine the prospects of cooperation 
among several countries. Furthermore, the optimal joint production of hydropower and 
migratory fish is investigated, thus taking into account the cross-sectoral approach in 
fisheries management. This thesis brings together important new information from different 
perspectives on the management of the Baltic Sea fisheries, and contributes to the 
existing literature with its novel bioeconomic and game theoretic applications enhancing 
holistic management. 
 
Keywords: fisheries management, bioeconomic modelling, optimisation, multispecies 
model, Baltic Sea, international fisheries agreements, game theory, coalition formation 
game, partition function game, climate change, hydropower, migratory fish, policy 
instruments, holistic management, ecosystem-based management 
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1 Introduction 
Many fish stocks worldwide are overfished, i.e., the stocks are not harvested sustainably. 
Overfishing may be either biological or economic. Biological overfishing means that fish 
are harvested so extensively that the biomass has negative marginal growth. It is 
estimated that 31% of the world’s commercial fish stocks are being biologically overfished 
(FAO 2016). Economic overfishing means that the profit, or the resource rent, is not 
maximised. The reasons for overfishing are failures of fisheries management (Beddington 
et al. 2007). 
Fisheries management easily face difficulties, as fish stocks are often 
managed as a common pool or common property resource. This means that it is difficult to 
exclude anyone from using it, and that harvesting by one user reduces the stock 
availability for other users (Ostrom et al. 1999). Additionally, the harvest levels have often 
been set too high due to political pressure to chase short-term benefits, and holistic 
ecosystem-based management has largely been lacking, which has increased the 
uncertainty in predicting management effects (Botsford et al. 1997). 
It is clear that the problems in fisheries management are complex and have 
many causes. Therefore, more holistic management has been called for in order to 
achieve biologically and economically sustainable fish stocks. Such an approach can be 
interpreted as integrated management of the ecosystem instead of concentrating on a 
single issue in isolation. The approach involves taking into account, for instance, the long-
term perspective, including climate change effects, the integrated management of several 
sectors impacting on the ecosystem, the management of groups of countries in the form of 
fisheries agreements, as well as species interactions in a multispecies setting (UNEP 
2011). Actually, the recent reform of the European Common Fisheries Policy has pursued 
multiannual ecosystem-based management, which relies on multispecies fisheries plans 
2 
 
rather than single-species management (EC 2013). However, few fisheries are actually 
managed on a multispecies basis (Voss et al. 2014).  
This thesis uses bioeconomic optimisation and game theory as the key 
methods in order to provide more holistic recommendations on how to manage fisheries in 
a biologically and economically sustainable manner. The management objective is 
maximum economic yield (MEY) instead of maximum sustainable yield (MSY), which is 
still widely applied in the real world, e.g., in the EU (EC 2013). MEY usually yields a more 
conservative management scheme in the long term than MSY, and thus enhances 
sustainable fisheries management. Indeed, MSY is not always seen as a sufficient level of 
management, and more conservative approaches have thus been suggested (Beddington 
et al. 2007). Additionally, MEY is a more holistic approach than MSY and takes into 
account, for instance, the costs of fishing in addition to the benefits (Botsford et al. 1997). 
The thesis consists of four studies:  
 
? Study I: Optimal bioeconomic multispecies fisheries management: A Baltic Sea 
case study; 
? Study II: International agreements in the multispecies Baltic Sea fisheries; 
? Study IIII: Economic and policy considerations regarding hydropower and migratory 
fish; 
? Study IV: Optimal joint production of hydropower and migratory fish: A case study in 
the Northern Baltic Sea. 
 
This thesis takes fisheries management towards a more holistic ecosystem-based 
approach, which can be interpreted as more integrated and holistic management of the 
ecosystem instead of concentrating on single issues in isolation (UNEP 2011). This is 
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fulfilled in four separate dimensions: Firstly, the thesis studies included several species in 
optimal management instead of only one species (Studies I and II). Secondly, the focus of 
the studies was not only on management in a single country; instead, the thesis research 
had a wider scope and analysed the prospects of cooperation among several countries 
(Study II). Thirdly, the problems were modelled by taking into account the long-term 
perspective, i.e., by maximising the resource rent over a long time period (Studies I, II and 
IV), and by analysing the possible effects of climate change (Studies I and II). Fourthly, the 
studies in this thesis applied a cross-sectoral approach and examined several sectors 
affecting the ecosystem (fisheries and energy sectors) instead of only focusing on one 
(Studies III and IV).  
Table 1 summarises the focus of the research in the thesis, the study region, 
methods applied, contributions to the literature, and dimensions of the holistic ecosystem-
based management of each study. Studies I and II used a multispecies bioeconomic 
model that was applied in the Baltic Sea. Study I concentrated on the sole owner optimum 
management of multispecies fisheries using dynamic numerical bioeconomic optimisation 
modelling. Study I was among the first to apply multispecies bioeconomic modelling in this 
region. Study II analysed the same multispecies fisheries in an international context with 
several players, using a coalition formation game approach, and assessed the stability of 
fisheries agreements and the strategic behaviour of the fishing nations. Such applications 
using a coalition formation approach in a multispecies setting have been uncommon, 
which places this study in a central position in the literature. Study III adds to the literature 
by comprehensively reviewing the central literature related to the conflict between 
hydropower and migratory fish from the economic point of view. The review outlines the 
prerequisites for future policies based on environmental standards, rather than technology 
standards, which have rarely been applied to the topic. Study IV bridged this gap in the 
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literature, and analysed the trade-off between hydropower production and migratory fish 
using a dynamic bioeconomic optimisation model. The study determined the optimal 
measures for the joint production of these two conflicting interests and highlighted that the 
optimal solution for each river may be case-specific, as was already argued in Study III. 
   
Table 1. Summary of the key components of the studies.  
  
 
The next section introduces the study region and the challenges of managing 
the Baltic Sea fisheries. Section 3 presents the underlying methods used in the thesis 
research, while section 4 compiles the main results of each study. Finally, section 5 
concludes the thesis. 
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2 Study region 
The main focus in this thesis is on the Baltic Sea fisheries, which are managed through the 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union (EU). The CFP allows equal 
access for its members to all EU fishing grounds, except for the 12 nm zone allocated to 
each nation (EEC 1970, modified in EC 2013), which creates a true common pool fishery. 
In 1983, total allowable catches (TACs) were introduced to the Baltic Sea fisheries, which 
set maximum fishing quotas for the most important species. TACs are set according to 
advice given by the Scientific, Technical and Economic Council of Fisheries (STECF) of 
the EU and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). 
The allocation of the TAC between member countries is based on the relative 
stability principle, according to which each country receives a fixed share of the aggregate 
TAC, which is primarily based on its historical catch records (EC 2371/2002). The 
allocation mechanism for national TACs varies among member states. Different forms of 
individual quota systems are the most common approach (Blenckner et al. 2011), through 
which a quota is allocated to individual fishermen or vessels. Although the CFP and the 
relative stability principle set boundaries on member states, countries are allowed to make 
strategic choices in the form of temporary exchanges of fishing quotas between countries 
(Andersen et al. 2009). The results of Study II demonstrate a potential situation that could 
arise from a more flexible management system, in which countries can trade quotas 
without any restrictions for relative stability. In fact, the relative stability rule may be 
outdated, and according to van Hoof (2013), a fixed allocation principle based on fish 
catches from the 1973–1978 reference period is unable to accommodate new conditions, 
such as stock development, new fishing strategies, fleet evolution and demand. 
 The three most commercially exploited species in the area are Baltic cod 
(Gadus morhua callarias), Baltic herring (Clupea harengus membras) and sprat (Sprattus 
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sprattus), which were the focus of Studies I and II. The cod is the most valuable of these 
species and the main predator in the Baltic Sea. It feeds on herring, which are used for 
human consumption or animal fodder, depending on their size, and on sprat, which are 
mainly used as fodder or for fish meal production.  
In the 1970s, the Baltic fishery was cod dominated. However, the cod stock 
rapidly decreased, and the sprat – a prey species of cod – simultaneously started to 
dominate the fishery, leading to a regime shift in the Baltic Sea. One explanation for this 
shift is seen to be extensive harvesting of cod based on a biological MSY management. 
The declined cod stock could then no longer restrict the sprat stock. Another explanation is 
presumably the changed environmental conditions, which favoured sprat. The successful 
spawning of cod is highly dependent on favourable environmental conditions, especially 
salinity and oxygen levels, and thus cod are currently mainly found in the southern parts of 
the Baltic Sea (Köster et al. 2005). It is possible that continuing climate change will lead to 
a decrease in the salinity level in the Baltic Sea, and thus the currently unfavourable 
conditions for cod recruitment will likely continue into the future (Meier 2006; Neumann 
2010). Additionally, cod have recently suffered from malnutrition because they have a 
relatively small geographical overlap with their prey species, and this has led to a lack of 
prey biomass (EC 2013; ICES 2014). These issues justify the importance of multispecies 
and climate change studies within this region, as addressed in Studies I and II. These 
studies demonstrated how the cod stock could be managed in a more sustainable way, 
both biologically and economically. Additionally, Study II showed how the international 
fisheries agreement among several countries harvesting cod and its prey species could be 
stabilised, and why it is important to include a multispecies approach in the management. 
Moreover, Study II provided an optimistic result suggesting that climate change may 
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actually improve the likelihood of a binding fisheries agreement, because with a lower cod 
biomass, countries will gain more from cooperation. 
 Additionally, the Baltic salmon (Salmo salar L.) is a significant species in the 
Baltic Sea fisheries. Migratory fish, including Baltic salmon, formerly spawned in most of 
the Baltic rivers. However, the size of the natural populations has seriously declined due to 
the construction of hydropower dams. Currently, in some countries, among them Finland, 
hydropower companies compensate for their damage to fisheries through obligatory 
annual fish releases. These reared individuals do not, however, survive as successfully as 
their wild counterparts (e.g., Jokikokko et al. 2006; Michielsens et al. 2006), which has 
raised the question of whether such releases sufficiently compensate for the loss of the 
stock. Recently, natural salmon populations have started to increase in the Northern Baltic 
Sea, which has resulted in a growing interest in protecting the wild salmon spawning areas 
in regulated rivers (Erkinaro et al. 2011). A recent trend in many countries is a shift in 
focus from stocking to the accommodation of the natural life cycle of fishes and the 
protection of migratory routes and habitats (Romakkaniemi et al. 2014). To achieve this 
restoration, fishways or other types of bypass channels are often suggested. However, the 
use of fishways creates opportunity costs, as water is released through fish passes at the 
expense of electricity production. Although the main focus and the public debate on 
mitigating this problem have concerned fishways, other measures should be considered, 
as fishways may not be beneficial at all sites and under all conditions considering their 
costs. Studies III and IV focused on the trade-off and alternative optimal solutions for the 
conflict between salmon and hydropower production in dammed rivers. 
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3 Methods 
This section presents the two key methods used in this thesis research: bioeconomic 
modelling and game theory. In particular, the sufficient level of biological complexity in 
bioeconomic models is discussed by focusing on a comparison of age-structured and 
biomass models, as well as the importance of taking into account the biological 
interactions between different species. Furthermore, the trade-off between hydropower 
production and migratory fish is introduced. Lastly, the central literature on game theoretic 
applications to fisheries management is reviewed. 
 
3.1 Bioeconomic modelling  
The main underlying method in Studies I, II and IV was numerical bioeconomic modelling 
combined with optimisation, in which the flow of resource rent over the considered time 
period was maximised using a relevant discount rate. Such models improve 
comprehension of the link between human activities, such as, harvesting, and natural 
resources, such as, fish stocks, as these two components are combined in the same 
model. Bioeconomic optimisation models can contribute to understanding the development 
of fishery behaviour, and they consequently enable an assessment of alternative policies. 
Additionally, a wide variety of external factors, such as climate change, multispecies 
interactions, harvesting costs, fish prices and management settings, affect both the 
ecological and the economic side (Prellezo et al. 2012). Therefore, it is essential to take 
both aspects into account when conducting comprehensive analysis. 
The first bioeconomic applications to fisheries were performed by Gordon 
(1954) and Schaefer (1957), who introduced a solution to the static fisheries problem. A 
dynamic application in continuous time was introduced by Clark and Munro (1975), who 
used a biomass model to examine population dynamics. The number of bioeconomic 
studies related to fisheries is rapidly increasing, and the studies have tackled a variety of 
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problems arising in fisheries, such as multispecies or ecosystem issues, uncertainty, 
fisheries agreements and climate change. Reviews on bioeconomic applications to 
fisheries include those by Bjørndal et al. (2004a) and Kronbak et al. (2014).  
  
3.1.1 The level of biological complexity  
A common debate in bioeconomic models regards the optimal or sufficient level of 
complexity in the biological representation. The practice was originally to use biomass 
models, where the population is simply lumped into a single parameter, i.e., the biomass is 
aggregated over all age classes. This approach, also known as a surplus growth model, is 
often sufficient to answer economic questions. In contrast, in fisheries science, fisheries 
ecology and stock assessment, practically all studies have adopted an age structure within 
the population dynamics, originating with Beverton and Holt (1957) (Tahvonen 2008). 
However, there is growing interest in also using age structures in bioeconomic studies, 
especially in empirical research (Tahvonen 2010), and economists have increasingly 
supported the use of such cohort models in order to avoid an oversimplistic representation 
of the real world (Steinshamn 2011). However, Clark (1990) argued that age-structured 
models are too complicated to determine analytical solutions, and such models are 
therefore still relatively rare. In contrast, Tahvonen (2009) stated that cohort models can 
be analytically tractable. 
 Studies I and II assessed the multispecies Baltic Sea fisheries using a 
deterministic bioeconomic age-structured model. The age structure provided more realistic 
population dynamics by taking into account, for instance, the higher predation by older cod 
on their prey species. Additionally, the age structure played an important role in one of the 
main results of the studies: decreased fishing pressure by cod leads to a stock with older 
individuals and therefore to a positive change in its age structure. However, the use of an 
age-structured model with a higher economic value for older individuals might also be 
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problematic given the imperfect selectivity of fishing gear, leading to pulse fishing 
(Hannesson 1975). In addition to the multispecies models in Studies I and II, the 
population dynamics of salmon were presented as a detailed age-structured model in 
Study IV. Such a model enabled sufficient illustration of the complex life cycle of salmon, 
and allowed the segregation of wild and reared individuals, which have relatively 
disaggregated life stage parameters. 
The interactions between different fish species affect the development of 
stocks in the Baltic Sea and have an important influence on both biological and economic 
performance. However, bioeconomic fishery models have often only been applied to one 
species, for example cod (Armstrong and Sumaila 2000; Kronbak and Lindroos 2007) or 
herring (Bjørndal et al. 2004b; Kulmala et al. 2007), and case studies including several 
species have mainly focused on regions other than the Baltic Sea (Danielsson et al. 1997; 
Ulrich et al. 2002; Brown et al. 2005). The interest in such multispecies studies in the 
economic literature started in the 1980s. Hannesson (1983) reported one of the first of 
such studies and concentrated on the role of the discount rate in the optimal fishery of 
ecologically interdependent species. More recently, studies have focused on a wide variety 
of topics, such as problems in bycatches (Reithe 2006), marine sanctuaries (Holland 2000) 
and technical interactions between fishing activities (Ulrich et al. 2002). However, there 
has been a lack of bioeconomic case studies on multispecies relationships in the Baltic 
Sea region (one recent example of such a study is that by Voss et al. 2014), although 
interest in ecosystem-based management, additionally taking into account the biological 
interactions between species, is increasing (Möllmann et al. 2014). Studies I and II bridged 
this gap in the literature. 
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3.1.2 Hydropower and migratory fish 
The spawning migration route of salmon and several other migratory fish species has been 
blocked in many rivers in the Baltic Sea by the construction of hydropower plants in the 
1950s and 1960s. In many cases, hydropower companies are obliged to annually 
compensate for the damage to fisheries by releasing reared individuals, and these 
individuals are commercially harvested by coastal and offshore fisheries (Erkinaro et al. 
2011). However, there is evidence that these reared individuals have lower survival rates 
than wild fish (Michielsens et al. 2006). Additionally, demand for the recreational use of 
river fisheries has increased, and the EU Water Framework Directive calls for a good 
ecological potential in heavily modified waters. Thus, interest in salmon stock restoration 
by promoting the natural life cycle of individuals in regulated rivers has gained increasing 
attention (Erkinaro et al. 2011), and there is clearly a need to study the topic from the 
economic point of view in order to find the most cost-effective solution to the problem.  
The optimal bioeconomic management of Baltic salmon has been 
investigated, for example, in the international context (Laukkanen 2003; Kulmala et al. 
2008; Kulmala et al. 2013), as well as that of the conflict between grey seals and Baltic 
salmon (Holma et al. 2014). However, research related to Baltic salmon has often 
overlooked the connection with hydropower. The recreational benefits arising from salmon 
angling in freely flowing rivers have been estimated in the Baltic Sea area (e.g., Appelblad 
2001; FGFRI 2009; Parkkila 2005), but studies considering the recreational value of 
regulated rivers have been scarce (Håkansson 2008; Kataria 2009; Parkkila et al. 2011). 
Studies that address the trade-off between hydropower and migratory fish or 
aim at comparing alternative measures to improve salmon migration have used cost–
benefit analysis (Laine 2006; Håkansson 2009; Johansson and Kriström 2012), multi-
criteria assessment (Dufva and Marttunen 2010; Karjalainen et al. 2011) or optimisation 
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modelling (Kuby et al. 2005; Jager and Martinez 2012; Halleraker et al. 2007; Fjeldstad et 
al. 2014). However, as Study III noted, economic literature aimed at defining optimal 
solutions for the conflict between hydropower production and salmon in a dynamic setting, 
and that can thus inform decision makers on alternative measures, is relatively scarce for 
the Baltic region. Study IV filled this gap in the literature. 
 
3.2 Game theory 
Game theory is a tool for analysing the strategic interactions of more than one rational 
decision maker, where the decisions made by one player also affect the outcome of the 
other players. This is what distinguishes a game theoretical problem from a traditional 
optimisation problem. In game theory, players choose their best action by taking into 
account the expected reactions of the other player (Miller et al. 2013). Due to the 
increased number and size of commercial fishing vessels, as well as improved technology, 
it is clear that fishing actions taken by one nation affect the size and composition of the 
catches of another nation, and thus the revenues of its fishing industry. Game theory can 
be used to assess how to manage internationally shared fish stocks to achieve biologically 
sustainable and economically efficient fishery management (Miller et al. 2013). 
Additionally, applications of game theoretic studies help to explain the conditions under 
which it is possible to achieve and maintain cooperation, and they are therefore useful 
when assessing policy options (Miller et al. 2013). Game theory can also be applied to 
study other problems such as competition between different uses of fish (commercial vs 
recreational fisheries) or principal-agent problems between boat owners and skippers or 
regulators and fishermen (Hannesson 2011). 
 The first game theoretic application to internationally shared fisheries was 
published by Munro (1979), who examined the problem of managing transboundary fish 
stocks, i.e., stocks migrating between several Exclusive Economic Zones. His main finding 
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was that cooperation between nations can be easier to achieve if side payments are used 
instead of sharing the benefits based on catches. This seminal research was soon 
followed by the studies of Clark (1980) and Levhari and Mirman (1980), and since then the 
literature has grown, with game theory being applied to various issues related to fisheries. 
The literature and its development have been reviewed, for example, by Sumaila (1999), 
Bailey et al. (2010), Hannesson (2011), Miller et al. (2013) and Pintassilgo et al. (2015). 
   
3.2.1 From cooperative to non-cooperative game theory 
Game theory can roughly be divided into cooperative and non-cooperative actions, 
although most games include elements from both branches. The cooperative exploitation 
of shared fish stocks yields full rent maximisation, whereas non-cooperation is likely to 
lead to the tragedy of the commons and rent dissipation (Gordon 1954; Scott 1955, Munro 
1979). 
Cooperative game theoretic analysis has often relied on a characteristic 
function (C-function) approach, which examines how payoffs should be fairly shared 
among coalition members (see, e.g., Kaitala and Lindroos 1998; Li 1998; Arnason et al. 
2000; Duarte et al. 2000). The prerequisite for successful cooperation is additional 
benefits, so that rationally behaving players will gain at least as much as from cooperation 
as they would from non-cooperation, and they consequently have an incentive to continue 
cooperating. Commonly used sharing rules (or sharing imputations) applied in C-function 
games based on different fairness concepts include the Shapley value (the average value 
of the marginal contribution to the coalition) (Shapley 1953), the nucleolus (maximising the 
minimum gain to any possible coalition) (Schmeidler 1969) and the Nash bargaining 
solution (yields equal weights of the gains) (Nash 1950). Ideally, the allocated benefits 
would be applied at the policy level and determined at the TAC level. However, as TACs 
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are usually based on historical catches, the sharing rules are often not currently applicable 
and thus do not represent the optimal first-best outcome (Kronbak and Lindroos 2012). 
Nevertheless, C-function games usually ignore positive externalities, which 
arise when decision makers affect the availability of the fish stock and hence the economic 
outcomes of others by their own actions. If externalities are neglected, the stability of the 
coalition may become threatened, as free-rider incentives may break the coalition 
(Kronbak and Lindroos 2007). When positive externalities are taken into account, i.e., the 
mergers’ positive effects on the payoffs of non-mergers are considered, a non-cooperative 
game of coalition formation, also known as the partition function (P-function) approach, 
can be applied (Pintassilgo 2003), as in Study II. A partition function game takes into 
account the entire coalition structure and not just the coalition in question, and it aims to 
determine which coalitions will form and how other coalitions will affect the cooperation 
incentives (Pintassilgo et al. 2015). Additionally, coalition games are capable of assessing 
cheating, when coalition members do not follow the rules of the agreement, and free-
riding, when non-members receive benefits from the cooperation (Miller et al. 2013). 
 Non-cooperative games aim at assessing which coalitions will form and how 
the existence of other coalitions will affect the incentives to cooperate. These incentives 
depend on the rules and the expected payoffs. Rules define, for instance, the information 
that each player has, the ability of players to communicate (bargaining) and whether 
actions are performed simultaneously or sequentially. In non-cooperative games, players 
maximise their own payoffs independently and take their actions accordingly (Miller et al. 
2013). This process makes non-cooperative games particularly relevant for International 
Environmental Agreements (IEA), as no external authority exists that can force players to 
join an agreement (Barrett 2003). Thus, any agreement must be self-enforcing (Barrett 
2003), according to which no player has the incentive to deviate from the strategy 
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(Gibbons 1992). This type of agreement can be facilitated by manipulating the rules in 
such a way that players find compliance to be the preferred strategy (Barrett 2003). 
 
3.2.2 Climate change and fisheries agreements 
The main challenge to fisheries management as related to climate change is that a lack of 
understanding and the unpredictability of biological impacts will have negative 
consequences for existing agreements, potentially even leading to breakdowns. 
Adaptation to climate change may be alleviated if more flexible allocation rules could be 
established (Miller and Munro 2004). Study II illustrated the effects of such a flexible 
management system, in which countries can trade quotas. As climate change may affect 
the migration routes and spatial distribution of fish stocks, among other effects, it may 
mean that the problem of new entrants becomes more common. Some suggested 
solutions to the problem include 1) sharing the quotas with the new entrant based on, for 
example, the Shapley value, 2) the expansion of quotas to create room for the new 
member, or 3) the introduction of property rights to the original members in the form of 
transferable quotas, allowing them to sell a portion to the new member. The second option 
has most commonly been implemented, leading to detrimental effects on fish stocks (Miller 
et al. 2013). 
  McKelvey et al. (2003) were the first to study this climate change effects on 
fisheries agreements. They argued that existing agreements may break down and that 
quota shares should therefore be more flexible. Liu et al. (2014) found that cost asymmetry 
improves the stability of a grand coalition when changes occur in the distribution of a fish 
stock. Liu and Heino (2013) demonstrated that players behave symmetrically when both 
players ignore future changes in the stock distribution. However, when the player losing 
stock takes climate change effects into account, it starts harvesting more aggressively 
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than the other player. Ellefsen (2013a) concluded that a new entrant destabilises the 
agreement, but can be encouraged to join the agreement through monetary payment. 
  According to the “paradox of cooperation”, introduced in the context of IEAs 
by Barrett (1994), cooperation is less likely when it is needed the most, i.e., when the most 
can be gained from it. This occurs, for instance, when the number of players is high and 
the relative gains from full cooperation would therefore be high, but the likelihood of 
reaching a large stable coalition remains low (Barrett 1994; Finus 2000). This paradox has 
been confirmed, for example, by Brandt and Kronbak (2010), who demonstrated that when 
climate change has a decreasing impact on the resource rent, stable fisheries agreements 
are less likely. However, the paradox is contradictory to the findings in Study II, according 
to which the need for cooperation increases under climate change, but so does the 
likelihood of establishing cooperation. This finding may be explained by the nature of the 
game involving multispecies fisheries, which affects the behaviour of the countries. Study 
II could be extended to take into account possible climate change effects on the spatial 
distribution of fish stocks, as currently only the effect on the size of fish stocks is 
examined. 
 
3.2.3 Multispecies game applications 
Multispecies or ecosystem game applications are still relatively scarce in the literature, 
although they might be useful for assessing international agreements in ecosystems that 
involve several species. Such studies include analyses of the optimal harvesting of 
species in a predator-prey system under cooperation (Sumaila 1997), the effects of the 
number of non-cooperative players on stock sizes in a two-species system (Kronbak and 
Lindroos 2011), comparison of cooperation and non-cooperation in a system of competing 
species and a predator-prey system (Wang and Ewald 2010), as well as in multispecies 
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and single-species management (Ellefsen 2013b). Although game theoretic applications 
using the multispecies approach have gained increasing interest, the use of a coalition 
formation approach, or a P-function approach, in a multispecies setting has been more or 
less overlooked. Study II filled this gap in the literature. 
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4 Summaries of the studies 
4.1 Study I: Optimal bioeconomic multispecies fisheries management: A 
Baltic Sea case study  
This study compared the optimal and current multispecies Baltic Sea management under 
different environmental conditions. The study took into consideration species from two 
different levels of the food web: the cod as a predator and the herring and sprat as prey 
species. The biological interactions between the species were taken into account through 
simple predation functions. The fishery for each species was optimised and compared with 
the status quo fishing policy. Additionally, a comparison with the current as well as with 
past environmental conditions was conducted, and climate change was thus taken into 
account. In addition to the interactions between the species, the biological realism was 
increased by using an age structure in the population dynamics.  
According to the results, the fishery of these species is not at the most 
profitable level, and with lower fishing mortalities, economic returns would be greater in the 
long term. A reduction in the fishing pressure on cod would result in the recovery of the 
stock, as individuals would have more time to grow and achieve a higher economic value, 
as well as a higher reproduction potential. Considering past environmental conditions, i.e., 
when conditions were better for cod recruitment, the cod stock had a better chance to 
recover even without a reduction in fishing mortality. Especially under the current 
environmental conditions, which are likely to prevail in the future due to the changing 
climate, optimal MEY management would yield significantly higher profits for the fishery 
than the current management.  
This study contributed to the literature by being among the first to apply 
multispecies bioeconomic modelling to the Baltic Sea region. It did so by using a simple 
predation function to illustrate the biological species interactions, which is more applicable 
19 
 
for economic optimisation. Such multispecies modelling provides more a realistic 
presentation of the population dynamics and moves bioeconomic fisheries management 
towards holistic ecosystem-based management. 
 
4.2 Study II: International agreements in the multispecies Baltic Sea fisheries 
This study continued Study I by analysing the age-structured multispecies fisheries in the 
Baltic Sea and taking into account the strategic interactions between fishing nations. The 
study focused on coalition formation through a partition function game between three 
asymmetric countries harvesting cod, herring and sprat. The players had complete 
information, i.e., the players' payoff functions were common knowledge among all players, 
and they adopted pure strategies. A multispecies approach is highly important for fisheries 
management, especially because the changing climate could cause regime shifts in 
marine systems and lead to the complete reorganization of marine communities (Miller et 
al. 2013).  
The results demonstrated that full cooperation, or a grand coalition, can only 
be maintained and stabilised when the most efficient country compensates the other 
countries for harvesting less; otherwise, the less efficient countries will harvest more than 
has been agreed upon. However, when using a single-species model for the cod 
population, such a solution is not feasible. This confirms that the scope of cooperation 
increases when fishery management is based on multispecies advice. Interestingly, the 
study also determined that climate change may actually improve the likelihood of a binding 
agreement. This is in contrast to the predominant conception, and occurs because 
countries will gain more from cooperation when the cod biomass is low. 
Although a wide range of game theoretic studies have been conducted in a 
single-species context, and multispecies aspects have gained increasing interest, 
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applications using a coalition formation approach, or a partition function approach, in a 
multispecies setting have been more or less overlooked, which places this study in a 
central position in the literature. This study contributed to the existing literature by 
combining coalitional games and a dynamic multispecies model. 
 
4.3 Study III: Economic and policy considerations regarding hydropower and 
migratory fish  
This study comprised a comprehensive review of the existing literature related to the 
effectiveness and costs of alternative measures promoting the joint production of 
hydropower and migratory fish species. The purpose of the review was to outline the 
prerequisites for future policies based on environmental standards, rather than technology 
standards, which have rarely been applied to the topic.  
The review details eight suggestions that must be taken into account when 
designing cost-effective measures to promote the sustainable production of hydropower 
while securing viable, genetically rich populations of migratory fish. According to the 
suggestions, the optimal measures are case-specific and highly dependent on their 
design, implementation and maintenance. In addition to tailored ex ante cost-effectiveness 
analyses, other preconditions for optimal solutions include effective and affordable 
monitoring and enforcement, and cooperation among power companies that share water-
use rights within a river basin, as well as among other stakeholders, such as the local 
community, fishermen and recreational users. 
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4.4 Study IV: Optimal joint production of hydropower and migratory fish: A 
case study in the Northern Baltic Sea 
This study determined the optimal measures maximising the benefits from the joint 
production of hydropower and salmon in a case river with five hydropower plants (the Iijoki 
River in the Northern Baltic Sea in Finland). The study used a numerical bioeconomic 
optimisation model and demonstrated that in such a heavily regulated river, it is optimal to 
trap and transport as many individuals as possible to restore the wild salmon stock. The 
construction of fishways would not be beneficial, as their investment and maintenance 
costs would exceed the benefits. Even a 20% decrease in the post-smolt or downstream 
mortality rate would not support the construction of fishways. However, if it is assumed that 
the river had only one hydropower plant blocking migration to the spawning area, a 
fishway would become the superior solution. Therefore, this study highlights that the 
optimal solution for each river may be case-specific, as was argued in Study III. 
In general, the positive and negative externalities arising from hydropower 
production are well known, but literature related to the economic consequences of different 
measures ensuring the return of migratory fish to rivers, which could be used to effectively 
inform decision-makers, is scarce. This topical study contributed to the literature by using a 
dynamic bioeconomic optimisation model to dynamically determine the optimal measures. 
 
  
22 
 
5 Conclusions 
This thesis brings together valuable knowledge on Baltic Sea fisheries management, and 
the studies forming the thesis have taken current research towards more holistic 
ecosystem-based management in four dimensions: 1) they applied a multispecies 
approach instead of relying on conventional single-species management; 2) they analysed 
the prospects of a fisheries agreement among several countries by applying a novel 
partition function approach, which took into account the positive externalities arising from 
the coalition formation; 3) they modelled the problems by taking into account the long-term 
perspective and analysed the possible future effects of climate change on the fishery; and 
4) they applied the cross-sectoral approach by simultaneously focusing on the fisheries 
and hydropower sectors, which both affect the ecosystem. 
 Although this thesis introduces holistic recommendations for biologically and 
economically more sustainable Baltic Sea fisheries, there are still further steps to be taken 
in order to move to comprehensive ecosystem-based management. First of all, instead of 
treating fish stocks as static and uniformly distributed all over the Baltic Sea, the inclusion 
of spatial considerations of the stocks would be important for future research. Additionally, 
this thesis covers only two trophic levels, i.e., predator and prey fish species, but lower 
trophic levels, including plankton, could also be taken into account. In the case of 
hydropower and migratory fish, a model considering the whole Baltic Sea system with 
several salmon rivers would further contribute to the literature. Such a study would allow 
the targeting of management measures individually to each river in order to achieve the 
most effective solution. Furthermore, the multi-sectoral game could be developed to 
include other relevant sectors, such as agriculture, due to its effects on the marine 
ecosystem through eutrophication. Lastly, an analysis is needed in the setting of a 
dynamic membership game, in which the membership decision of fishing nations is 
periodically revised.  
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